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Unitary t-designs are the bread and butter of quantum information theory
and beyond. An important issue in practice is that of efficiently constructing
good approximations of such unitary t-designs. Building on results by Aubrun
(Comm. Math. Phys. 2009), we prove that sampling dtpoly(t, log d, 1/) uni-
taries from an exact t-design provides with positive probability an -approximate
t-design, if the error is measured in one-to-one norm distance of the correspond-
ing t-twirling channels. As an application, we give a partially derandomized
construction of a quantum encryption scheme that has roughly the same key
size and security as the quantum one-time pad, but possesses the additional
property of being non-malleable against adversaries without quantum side in-
formation.
1 Introduction
Random unitaries, drawn from the Haar measure on the unitary group, play an im-
portant role in many aspects of theoretical quantum information science. For instance,
most results on quantum source and channel coding are obtained with Haar-random cod-
ing strategies [HHWY08, ADHW09, BCR11] using the decoupling technique [HOW07,
SDTR13, DBWR14, MBD+17]. The columns and rows of Haar random unitaries are Haar
random unit vectors and have also found many applications in quantum information theory,
e.g. for constructing quantum money schemes [JLS18, AMR19]. However, it is infeasible in
practice to even just approximate Haar random unitaries, the randomness and number of
gates necessary to sample and implement them being exponential in the number of qubits
they act on.
In most situations, unitary t-designs, the quantum analogues of t-wise independent
functions, come to the rescue [DCEL09]. A unitary t-design is a measure on the unitary
group that reproduces the Haar measure up to the t-th moment. This means that a random
unitary sampled from a t-design can replace a Haar-random unitary in any situation where
it is only applied t times. For practical purposes, one would like this measure to be
more economical than the Haar measure (for instance to have finite, as small as possible,
support). Often even approximate versions of unitary t-designs (in the right metrics)
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are already sufficient. In quantum information theory and related fields the most common
metric between measures on the unitary group is the completely bounded one-to-one norm,
or diamond norm, on the induced t-twirling channels. The t-twirling channel associated to
a measure is the channel that can be implemented by sampling a unitary according to the
measure, and then applying it to each sub-system of a t-partite input system.
In [HLSW04], approximate 1-designs have been studied using a metric based on the (not
completely bounded) one-to-one norm. There, it is shown that approximate 1-designs in
this weaker sense can be made of much fewer unitaries, and that they still have interesting
applications, such as unconditionally secure encryption of quantum data when confiden-
tiality is only desired against adversaries without quantum side information. The former
result is shown by proving that sampling a small number of independent Haar-random
unitaries provides with high probability an approximate 1-design. This construction was
subsequently partially derandomized in [Aub09].
Let us mention one last result which was known prior to this work. It was shown in
[LW17] that, in fact, any channel can be approximated in one-to-one norm by a channel
having few Kraus operators. However, this does not tell us whether it can be further
imposed that the Kraus operators of this approximating channel are of a specific form
(such as e.g. being tensor powers of unitaries sampled from a simple enough distribution,
which is what we are interested in here).
Our contribution
In this work, we generalize the approach of [Aub09] to construct small approximate t-
designs, for any given t, in one-to-one norm distance. In addition, for t = 2, we show that
the approach extends to designs where the goal is to approximate the channel twirl, i.e. the
transformation of quantum channels obtained by sampling a unitary, applying it to the
input state before the channel acts on it, and undoing this action afterwards. Here, the
appropriate distance is the one stemming from the operator norm induced by the diamond
norm, which we call diamond-to-diamond norm. To prove the approximation result on the
so-called U⊗t-twirl, we use basic representation theory of the unitary group, including the
Weyl dimension formula, to show that this channel has small one-to-operator norm. This
allows us to apply the powerful probabilistic and functional analytic tools developed in
[Aub09]. For the channel twirl, the invariant space spanned by the identity, as well as the
off-diagonal terms involving this invariant space, require a careful analysis. Along the way,
we also construct a design that approximates the so-called U ⊗ U¯ -twirl, the image of the
channel twirl under the Choi-Jamiołkowski isomorphism.
An application
Subsequently, we apply our results in a cryptographic context. We show, that an ap-
proximate channel-twirl design in the diamond-to-diamond norm metric can be used to
construct a quantum encryption scheme that is as secure as the quantum one-time pad
and has (essentially) the same key length, but also is non-malleable against adversaries
without quantum side information.
2
Related work
Unitary t-designs exist for all t and all dimensions [Kan15]1. For t > 3, time-efficient
constructions are, however, only known for approximate unitary t-designs [BHH16]. The
sub-sampling technique that we use, following [Aub09], i.e. the strategy of sampling (a
small number of) random unitaries from an exact design, was first introduced in [ABW09]
to show the existence of small approximate 2-designs.
Non-malleability for quantum encryption was first introduced and characterized in
[ABW09]. In this work it was also shown that the notion of quantum non-malleability is
equivalent to the notion of approximate unitary 2-designs, under the condition that the
encryption algorithm be unitary. Subsequently, non-malleability for quantum encryption
has been further studied in [AM17, MSvW19].
Notation and standard definitions
Let us gather here notation that we will be using throughout the whole paper. Given
d ∈ N, we denote by L(d) the set of linear operators on Cd, by D(d) the set of quantum
states (i.e. positive semidefinite and trace 1 operators) on Cd, and by U(d) the set of
unitary operators on Cd. We additionally denote by L(d) the set of linear operators
on L(d), and by C(d) the set of quantum channels (i.e. completely positive and trace-
preserving operators) on L(d). Let us conclude with some standard notation/definitions
from probability theory. Given a random variable X, we denote by EX its average and by
P(X ∈ E) the probability that X satisfies event E. We say that ε is a Bernoulli random
variable if P(ε = +1) = P(ε = −1) = 1/2.
2 Representation theoretic preliminaries
Given t ∈ N let St be the permutation group of {1, . . . , t}. The irreducible representations
[λ] of St are called Specht modules and are indexed by integer partitions of t, denoted as
λ ` t. Such a partition is represented as a tuple λ = (λ1, ..., λr) ∈ Nr, for some r ∈ N,
with λ1 > · · · > λr and ∑ri=1 λi = t.
Given d ∈ N let U(d) be the unitary group of Cd. The polynomial irreducible repre-
sentations Vλ of U(d) are called Weyl modules and are indexed by integer partitions of any
number t ∈ N into exactly d parts (some of which might be 0), denoted as λ ` (t, d). The
dimension of the Weyl module Vλ is given by the Weyl dimension formula
mλ =
∏
i,j∈{1,...,d}
i<j
λi − λj + j − i
j − i . (1)
A particular vector space that carries representations of both St and U(d) is
(
Cd
)⊗t
.
The corresponding actions are defined as
∀ σ ∈ St, σ.|φ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φt〉 = |φσ−1(1)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φσ−1(t)〉,
∀ U ∈ U(d), U.|φ〉 = U⊗t|φ〉.
The two actions commute, i.e.
(
Cd
)⊗t
decomposes into a direct sum of irreducible repre-
sentations (irreps) of the product group St×U(d). These irreps are just tensor products of
1In [Kan15], the existence of exact designs is proven in a much more general context, see [AMR19,
Corollary 2] for a straightforward application to the unitary case.
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an irrep of St with an irrep of U(d). What is more, the corresponding representations of the
group algebras of St and U(d) are double commutants, implying that the decomposition
is multiplicity free.
Theorem 2.1 (Schur-Weyl duality). Let St and U(d) act on
(
Cd
)⊗t
as described above.
The direct sum decomposition into irreducible representations of St × U(d) is multiplicity
free, and is given by (
Cd
)⊗t ∼= ⊕
λ`(t,d)
Vλ ⊗ [λ]. (2)
Define the quantum channel T (t) on (Cd)⊗t as
T (t) : X ∈ L(dt) 7→
∫
U∈U(d)
U⊗tXU∗⊗tdU ∈ L(dt), (3)
where dU stands for the Haar measure on U(d). The channel T (t) is often referred to as
a twirling channel. It is obviously covariant with respect to the action of U(d). Hence,
denoting by W the isomorphism between the right and left hand sides of equation (2)
above, Schur’s Lemma implies that
WT (t)(W ∗(·)W )W ∗ =
∑
λ`(t,d)
τVλ ⊗ TrVλ [Pλ(·)Pλ] , (4)
where Pλ is the projector onto Vλ ⊗ [λ] in
⊕
λ`(t,d) Vλ ⊗ [λ] and τVλ = 1Vλ/mλ is the
maximally mixed state on Vλ.
Let us make things slightly more explicit in the case t = 2. We have(
Cd
)⊗2 ∼= ∧2(d)⊕ ∨2(d),
where ∧2(d) and ∨2(d) are, respectively, the symmetric and anti-symmetric subspaces of(
Cd
)⊗2
. The corresponding projectors are P∧2(d) = (1 + F )/2 and P∨2(d) = (1 − F )/2,
where F denotes the so-called flip operator. And the action of T (2) can be explicitly written
as, for any X ∈ L(d2),
T (2)(X) = 2
d(d+ 1) Tr
(
P∧2(d)XP∧2(d)
)
P∧2(d) +
2
d(d− 1) Tr
(
P∨2(d)XP∨2(d)
)
P∨2(d).
Fix a basis B = {|i〉}d−1i=0 for Cd (which we refer to as the computational basis). Let
T be the transposition in this basis and denote by XΓ the partial transposition of X
(i.e. XΓ = id⊗ T(X)). It is easy to check that, for any X ∈ L(d2),
T (2)(X)Γ =
(∫
U∈U(d)
U ⊗ U X U∗ ⊗ U∗dU
)Γ
=
∫
U∈U(d)
U ⊗ U¯ XΓ U∗ ⊗ U¯∗dU.
Let us define the quantum channel T (1,1) on (Cd)⊗2 as
∀ X ∈ L(d2), T (1,1)(X) =
∫
U∈U(d)
U ⊗ U¯ X U∗ ⊗ U¯∗dU. (5)
By the preceding discussion, we know that T (1,1)(X) can be written as a linear combination
of PΓ∧2(d) and P
Γ
∨2(d). Now, 1Γ = 1 and FΓ = d|ψ〉〈ψ|, where
|ψ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉
4
is the standard maximally entangled state with respect to B. So equivalently, T (1,1)(X)
can be written as a linear combination of |ψ〉〈ψ| and Q = 1− |ψ〉〈ψ|, which are orthogonal
to one another. More specifically
∀ X ∈ L(d2), T (1,1)(X) = 〈ψ|X|ψ〉|ψ〉〈ψ|+ 1
d2 − 1 Tr(QX)Q. (6)
3 Several channel approximation results
3.1 Approximating the twirling channel T (t)
Let t ∈ N be such that t 6 d/2. The goal here is to show that the twirling channel T (t),
as defined by equation (3), can be approximated with ‘few’ Kraus operators sampled from
a ‘simple’ probability measure. We will be able to prove such approximation in a strong
sense, namely in one-to-infinity norm.
A probability measure µ on U(d) is called a t-design if
∀ X ∈ L(dt),
∫
U∈U(d)
U⊗tXU∗⊗tdµ(U) = T (t)(X).
We will show the following result:
Theorem 3.1. Let 0 <  < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U(d) is a
t-design, and let U1, . . . , Un be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal
constant C > 0 such that, if n > C(td)t(t log d)6/2, then with probability at least 1/2, we
have
∀ ρ ∈ D(dt),
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
U⊗ti ρU
∗⊗t
i − T (t)(ρ)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
6 
dt
.
Theorem 3.1 generalizes [Aub09, Theorem 2] to t-designs for any t ∈ N rather than
only for 1-designs. We actually follow the exact same proof strategy as that of [Aub09,
Theorem 2]. The only additional technical lemma that we need in the case t > 1 is one
that tells us that T (t) has a small (1→∞)-norm (a fact which is obvious for t = 1).
Lemma 3.2. The quantum channel T (t) is such that
sup
ρ∈D(dt)
∥∥∥T (t)(ρ)∥∥∥∞ 6
(2t
d
)t
.
Proof. By equation (4), the operator norm in question is just given by the inverse of the
minimal dimension of an irrep Vλ,
sup
ρ∈D(dt)
∥∥∥T (t)(ρ)∥∥∥∞ = 1minλ`(t,d)mλ .
Indeed, let us denote by λ∗ the partition minimizing mλ. It is clear that if |φλ∗〉 ∈ Vλ∗
and |ϕλ∗〉 ∈ [λ∗], then
∥∥∥T (t)(|φλ∗〉〈φλ∗ | ⊗ |ϕλ∗〉〈ϕλ∗ |∥∥∥∞ = 1/mλ∗ . And this is obviously
maximizing
∥∥∥T (t)(ρ)∥∥∥∞ as T (t) begins with a pinching with respect to the direct sum
decomposition (2). We go on to find a lower bound on mλ∗ using the formula (1). To this
end we first note that λ∗ is a partition of t into d parts, so λ∗i = 0 for all i > t. Noting that
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all the factors in the product in equation (1) are lower bounded by 1, and only keeping
factors such that i ≤ t < j we get
mλ∗ ≥
∏
i,j∈{1,...,d}
i≤t<j
λ∗i + j − i
j − i
=
t∏
i=1
d∏
j=t+1
λ∗i + j − i
j − i
=
t∏
i=1
(λ∗i + d− i)!(t− i)!
(λ∗i + t− i)!(d− i)!
=
t∏
i=1
λ∗i∏
α=1
d− i+ α
t− i+ α .
As a final step we use that (a−x)/(b−x) ≥ a/b for all a, b, x ∈ R such that a ≥ b > x ≥ 0,
and that α ≤ t. We thus conclude that
t∏
i=1
λ∗i∏
α=1
d− i+ α
t− i+ α ≥
t∏
i=1
λ∗i∏
α=1
d+ α
t+ α ≥
t∏
i=1
λ∗i∏
α=1
d
2t =
t∏
i=1
(
d
2t
)λ∗i
>
(
d
2t
)t
,
where the last inequality is because d > 2t by assumption and λ∗i > 1.
We then need the technical result below, which is an immediate corollary of [Aub09,
Lemma 5] (which itself makes crucial use of Dudley’s inequality and a duality argument
for entropy numbers).
Lemma 3.3. Let U1, . . . , Un ∈ U(d). For ε1, . . . , εn independent Bernoulli random vari-
ables, we have
E
(
sup
ρ∈D(dt)
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
εiU
⊗t
i ρU
∗⊗t
i
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
)
6 C(t log d)5/2(logn)1/2 sup
ρ∈D(dt)
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
U⊗ti ρU
∗⊗t
i
∥∥∥∥∥
1/2
∞
,
where C > 0 is a universal constant.
Proof. This follows directly from [Aub09, Lemma 5], applied with dt playing the role of d
and U⊗ti playing the role of Ui, 1 6 i 6 n.
With these two preliminary lemmas at hand, we are now in position to prove Theorem
3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let V1, . . . , Vn be independent copies of U1, . . . , Un and let ε1, . . . , εn
be independent Bernoulli random variables. Setting
M = sup
ρ∈D(dt)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
U⊗ti ρU
∗⊗t
i − T (t)(ρ)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
,
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we then have
EM = EU
(
sup
ρ∈D(dt)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
U⊗ti ρU
∗⊗t
i −EV
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
V ⊗ti ρV
∗⊗t
i
)∥∥∥∥∥
∞
)
6 EU,V
(
sup
ρ∈D(dt)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
(
U⊗ti ρU
∗⊗t
i − V ⊗ti ρV ∗⊗ti
)∥∥∥∥∥
∞
)
= EU,V,ε
(
sup
ρ∈D(dt)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
εi
(
U⊗ti ρU
∗⊗t
i − V ⊗ti ρV ∗⊗ti
)∥∥∥∥∥
∞
)
6 2 EU,ε
(
sup
ρ∈D(dt)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
εiU
⊗t
i ρU
∗⊗t
i
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
)
,
where the first inequality is by Jensen’s inequality, the second equality is by symmetry,
and the third inequality is by the triangle inequality.
Hence, by Lemma 3.3, we get
EM 6 2C√
n
(t log d)5/2(logn)1/2E
 sup
ρ∈D(dt)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
U⊗ti ρU
∗⊗t
i
∥∥∥∥∥
1/2
∞

6 2C√
n
(t log d)5/2(logn)1/2E
(
M +
(2t
d
)t)1/2
6 2C√
n
(t log d)5/2(logn)1/2
(
E
(
M +
(2t
d
)t))1/2
,
where the second inequality is by Lemma 3.2 while the third inequality is by Jensen’s
inequality.
Now, it is easy to check that, given X,α, β > 0, if X 6 α
√
X + β, then X 6 α2 +α
√
β.
Therefore, we eventually obtain
EM 6 4C
2
n
(t log d)5 logn+ 2C√
n
(t log d)5/2(logn)1/2
(2t
d
)t/2
.
And the latter quantity is smaller than /dt as soon as n is larger than C ′(td)t(t log d)6/2.
To conclude, we just have to use Markov’s inequality, which guarantees that, if EM 6
/dt, then
P
(
M 6 2
dt
)
> 1− EM2/dt >
1
2 .
This is exactly what we wanted to show (after relabelling 2 in  and 4C ′ in C).
Remark 3.4. Note that, up to a poly(t, log d) factor, the result of Theorem 3.1 is optimal,
in the sense that it is impossible to approximate the twirling channel T (t) with less than
order dt operators. This is true even if we only require -approximation in (1→ 1)-norm
rather than /dt-approximation in (1→∞)-norm. Indeed, the following general result was
shown in [LW17, Section 5.1]: If T, Tˆ are channels on L(d′) which are -close in (1→ 1)-
norm, then the Kraus rank r(Tˆ ) of Tˆ (i.e. the minimal number of Kraus operators for Tˆ )
satisfies
log r(Tˆ ) > (1− ) max
ρ∈D(d′)
|S(T (ρ))− S(ρ)| ,
7
where S(·) is the von Neumann entropy. In particular, if T is such that, for all ρ ∈ D(d′),
‖T (ρ)‖∞ 6 c/d′, then
max
ρ∈D(d′)
|S(T (ρ))− S(ρ)| > log
(
d′
c
)
,
and hence necessarily
r(Tˆ ) >
(
d′
c
)1−
.
In the case of the channel T (t) on L(dt), we know by Lemma 3.2 that, for all ρ ∈ D(dt),
‖T (t)(ρ)‖∞ 6 (2t/d)t. So if a channel Tˆ (t) is -close to T (t) in (1→ 1)-norm, then it has
to satisfy r(Tˆ (t)) > (d/2t)(1−)t.
3.2 Approximating the twirling channel T (1,1)
The goal here is to show that the twirling channel T (1,1), as defined by equation (5), can
be approximated with ‘few’ Kraus operators sampled from a ‘simple’ probability measure.
We will only be able to prove such approximation in a weaker sense than in the case of
T (t) treated before, namely in one-to-one norm.
If µ is a 2-design on U(d), then, by equation (5), we have that
∀ X ∈ L(d2),
∫
U∈U(d)
U ⊗ U¯ X U∗ ⊗ U¯∗dµ(U) = T (1,1)(X).
We will show the following result:
Theorem 3.5. Let 0 <  < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U(d) is a
2-design, and let U1, . . . , Un be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal
constant C > 0 such that, if n > Cd2(log d)6/2, then with probability at least 1/2, we
have
∀ ρ ∈ D(d2),
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
Ui ⊗ U¯i ρU∗i ⊗ U¯∗i − T (1,1)(ρ)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
6 .
The way we prove Theorem 3.5 is by first analysing separately the cases where the input
state is the maximally entangled state or a state orthogonal to it. This is the content of
Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 below.
Proposition 3.6. Assume that the probability measure µ on U(d) is a 2-design, and let
U1, . . . , Un be sampled independently from µ. Then,
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ui ⊗ U¯i |ψ〉〈ψ|U∗i ⊗ U¯∗i = T (1,1)(|ψ〉〈ψ|).
Proof. We just have to notice that, for any U ∈ U(d), U ⊗ U¯ |ψ〉 = |ψ〉. And thus,
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ui ⊗ U¯i |ψ〉〈ψ|U∗i ⊗ U¯∗i = |ψ〉〈ψ| = T (1,1)(|ψ〉〈ψ|),
as announced.
Proposition 3.7. Let 0 <  < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U(d) is a
2-design, and let U1, . . . , Un be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal
constant C > 0 such that, if n > Cd2(log d)6/2, then with probability at least 1/2, we
have
∀ ρ ∈ D(d2), ρ ⊥ ψ,
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
Ui ⊗ U¯i ρU∗i ⊗ U¯∗i − T (1,1)(ρ)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
6 
d2
.
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In order to prove Proposition 3.7 we follow the same route as to prove Theorem 3.1.
We thus begin by observing that T (1,1) has a small (1 → ∞)-norm on the orthogonal of
the maximally entangled state, which is the analogue of Lemma 3.2 in the study of T (t).
Lemma 3.8. The quantum channel T (1,1) is such that
sup
ρ∈D(d2), ρ⊥ψ
∥∥∥T (1,1)(ρ)∥∥∥∞ = 1d2 − 1 .
Proof. By equation (6), we see that, for any state ρ orthogonal to |ψ〉〈ψ|, T (1,1)(ρ) =
Q/(d2 − 1), so that ‖T (1,1)(ρ)‖∞ = 1/(d2 − 1).
We then need the technical result below, which is the analogue of Lemma 3.3 in the
study of T (t).
Lemma 3.9. Let U1, . . . , Un ∈ U(d). For ε1, . . . , εn independent Bernoulli random vari-
ables, we have
E
(
sup
ρ∈D(d2), ρ⊥ψ
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
εiUi ⊗ U¯i ρU∗i ⊗ U¯∗i
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
)
6 C(log d)5/2(logn)1/2 sup
ρ∈D(d2), ρ⊥ψ
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
Ui ⊗ U¯i ρU∗i ⊗ U¯∗i
∥∥∥∥∥
1/2
∞
,
where C > 0 is a universal constant.
Proof. This follows directly from [Aub09, Lemma 5], applied with d2 − 1 playing the role
of d and Ui ⊗ U¯i playing the role of Ui, 1 6 i 6 n.
With Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9 at hand it is straightforward to prove Proposition 3.7, starting
from the same symmetrization trick than the one which allows to prove Theorem 3.1 from
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. We therefore do not repeat the proof here.
So we can now combine Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 to get Theorem 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. By convexity of ‖ · ‖1 and extremality of pure states amongst all
states, it is enough to prove that the result is true for all pure input states. Given |ϕ〉 a
unit vector, we can write it as |ϕ〉 = α|ψ〉 + β|ψ′〉, where α = 〈ψ|ϕ〉, |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 and
|ψ′〉 is a unit vector orthogonal to |ψ〉. Defining
∆ : X ∈ L(d2) 7→ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ui ⊗ U¯iX U∗i ⊗ U¯∗i − T (1,1)(X) ∈ L(d2), (7)
we then have
‖∆(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|)‖1 = ‖|α|2∆(|ψ〉〈ψ|) + |β|2∆(|ψ′〉〈ψ′|) + αβ¯∆(|ψ〉〈ψ′|) + α¯β∆(|ψ′〉〈ψ|)‖1
6 |α|2‖∆(|ψ〉〈ψ|)‖1 + |β|2‖∆(|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)‖1 + 2|α||β|‖∆(|ψ〉〈ψ′|)‖1.
First, we know from Proposition 3.6 that ‖∆(|ψ〉〈ψ|)‖1 = 0, while we know from Propo-
sition 3.7 that, with probability at least 3/4, for any |ψ′〉 orthogonal to |ψ〉, ‖∆(|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)‖1 6
d2‖∆(|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)‖∞ 6 . Second, we know that we can write |ψ′〉 = X ⊗ 1|ψ〉 for some X
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such that Tr(X) = 0 and ‖X‖2 =
√
d. That way, since for any U ∈ U(d), U ⊗ U¯ |ψ〉 = |ψ〉
and UX ⊗ U¯ |ψ〉 = UXU∗ ⊗ 1|ψ〉, we get
‖∆(|ψ〉〈ψ′|)‖1 =
∥∥∥∥∥|ψ〉〈ψ|
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
UiXU
∗
i − T (1)(X)
)
⊗ 1
∥∥∥∥∥
1
6
∥∥∥∥∥
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
UiXU
∗
i − T (1)(X)
)
⊗ 1
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
UiXU
∗
i − T (1)(X)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
.
Now, we know from Theorem 3.1 (for t = 1) that, with probability at least 3/4, for any
X such that ‖X‖2 =
√
d,∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
UiXU
∗
i − T (1)(X)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
6 
d
‖X‖1 6 √
d
‖X‖2 = 
(actually as soon as n > Cd(log d)6/2, hence a fortiori for n > Cd2(log d)6/2).
Putting everything together we eventually obtain that, with probability at least 1/2,
for any |ϕ〉,
‖∆(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|)‖1 6 32 ,
which, up to re-labelling 3/2 in , is exactly what we wanted to prove.
Remark 3.10. It can be shown that the result of Theorem 3.5 is optimal, up to a
poly(log d) factor, just as the one of Theorem 3.1. Indeed, using again the result of [LW17,
Section 5.1], together with Lemma 3.8, we see that, if a channel Tˆ (1,1) is -close to T (1,1)
in (1→ 1)-norm, then it has to satisfy r(Tˆ (1,1)) > (d2 − 1)1−.
3.3 Approximating the twirling super-channel Θ
We are now interested in a slightly different kind of twirling, namely one that acts on
channels rather than states. We thus define the quantum super-channel Θ on Cd as
Θ :M∈ L(d) 7→
(
Θ(M) : X ∈ L(d) 7→
∫
U∈U(d)
UM(U∗XU)U∗dU
)
. (8)
Similarly as before, we here want to show that Θ can be approximated by sampling ‘few’
unitaries from a ‘simple’ probability measure. We will be able to prove approximation in
completely bounded one-to-one norm (also known as diamond norm) for all input channel.
More precisely, denoting by id : L(d) → L(d) the identity map on L(d), we will show
the following result:
Theorem 3.11. Let 0 <  < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U(d) is a
2-design, and let U1, . . . , Un be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal
constant C > 0 such that, if n > Cd2(log d)6/2, then with probability at least 1/2, we
have, for all N ∈ C(d) and all ρ ∈ D(d2),∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
1⊗ Ui id⊗N (1⊗ U∗i ρ1⊗ Ui)1⊗ U∗i − id⊗Θ(N )(ρ)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
6 .
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Proof. By convexity of ‖·‖1 and extremality of pure states amongst all states, it is enough
to prove that the result is true for all pure input states (and all input channels). Let N
be a channel and |ϕ〉 be a pure state, which we can write as |ϕ〉 = X ⊗ 1|ψ〉 for some X
such that ‖X‖2 =
√
d. Now, for any U ∈ U(d), X ⊗ U∗|ψ〉 = XU¯ ⊗ 1|ψ〉, so that
1⊗ U id⊗N (1⊗ U∗ |ϕ〉〈ϕ|1⊗ U)1⊗ U∗
= 1⊗ U id⊗N (X ⊗ U∗ |ψ〉〈ψ|X∗ ⊗ U)1⊗ U∗
= 1⊗ U id⊗N (XU¯ ⊗ 1 |ψ〉〈ψ| U¯∗X∗ ⊗ 1)1⊗ U∗
= X ⊗ 1U ⊗ U¯ id⊗N (|ψ〉〈ψ|)U∗ ⊗ U¯∗X∗ ⊗ 1.
Therefore, defining ∆ as in equation (7), we have∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
1⊗ Ui id⊗N (1⊗ U∗i ρ1⊗ Ui)1⊗ U∗i − id⊗Θ(N )(ρ)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
= ‖X ⊗ 1∆(id⊗N (|ψ〉〈ψ|))X∗ ⊗ 1‖1. (9)
We now proceed exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.5. First, by Proposition 3.6,
∆(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = 0, so that
‖X ⊗ 1∆(|ψ〉〈ψ|)X∗ ⊗ 1‖1 = 0.
Second, by Proposition 3.7, with probability at least 3/4, for any |ψ′〉 orthogonal to |ψ〉,
‖∆(|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)‖∞ 6 /d2, so that
‖X ⊗ 1∆(|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)X∗ ⊗ 1‖1 6 ‖X ⊗ 1‖2‖X∗ ⊗ 1‖2‖∆(|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)‖∞
= ‖X‖22‖1‖22‖∆(|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)‖∞
6 ,
where the first inequality is by Hölder inequality while the last inequality is simply recalling
that ‖X‖2 = ‖1‖2 =
√
d. Third, any |ψ′〉 orthogonal to |ψ〉 can be written as |ψ′〉 =
Y ⊗ 1|ψ〉 for some Y such that Tr(Y ) = 0 and ‖Y ‖2 =
√
d. Since for any U ∈ U(d),
U ⊗ U¯ |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 and UY ⊗ U¯ |ψ〉 = UY U∗ ⊗ 1|ψ〉, we then get
‖X ⊗ 1∆(|ψ〉〈ψ′|)X∗ ⊗ 1‖1 =
∥∥∥∥∥X ⊗ 1 |ψ〉〈ψ|
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
UiY
∗U∗i − T (1)(Y ∗)
)
⊗ 1X∗ ⊗ 1
∥∥∥∥∥
1
6 ‖X ⊗ 1 |ψ〉‖
∥∥∥∥∥X ⊗ 1
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
UiY U
∗
i − T (1)(Y )
)
⊗ 1 |ψ〉
∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥X
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
UiY U
∗
i − T (1)(Y )
)
⊗ 1 |ψ〉
∥∥∥∥∥
6
∥∥∥∥∥X
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
UiY U
∗
i − T (1)(Y )
)
⊗ 1
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
=
∥∥∥∥∥X
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
UiY U
∗
i − T (1)(Y )
)∥∥∥∥∥
∞
6 ‖X‖∞
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
UiY U
∗
i − T (1)(Y )
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
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where the second equality is because ‖X ⊗ 1|ψ〉‖ = ‖|ϕ〉‖ = 1. Now on the one hand
‖X‖∞ 6 ‖X‖2 =
√
d. And on the other hand, by Theorem 3.1 for t = 1 and /
√
d instead
of , we get that, for n > Cd2(log d)6/2, with probability at least 3/4, for all Y such that
‖Y ‖2 =
√
d, ∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
UiY U
∗
i − T (1)(Y )
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
6 
d
√
d
‖Y ‖1 6 
d
‖Y ‖2 = √
d
.
And thus, with probability at least 3/4, for any |ψ′〉 orthogonal to |ψ〉,
‖X ⊗ 1∆(|ψ〉〈ψ′|)X∗ ⊗ 1‖1 6 32 .
Putting everything together, we obtain that, with probability at least 1/2, for any state
σ (in particular for σ = id⊗N (|ψ〉〈ψ|)),
‖X ⊗ 1∆(σ)X∗ ⊗ 1‖1 6 32 .
Inserting this into equation (9), and re-labelling 3/2 in , yields exactly the claimed
result.
3.4 An alternative formulation
Given a linear map acting on a normed vector space (that of either operators or super-
operators in our case), it is natural to define its so-called induced norms. For a linear map
M : L(d) → L(d), the most relevant induced norm is the one-to-one norm, as well as its
completely bounded counterpart (also known as diamond norm). These are defined as
‖M‖1→1 = sup
X∈L(d), ‖X‖161
‖M(X)‖1 and ‖M‖ = sup
k∈N
‖idk ⊗M‖1→1,
where idk : L(k) → L(k) denotes the identity map on L(k). By extension, for a linear
map Ξ : L(d) → L(d), the most relevant induced norm is the diamond-to-diamond norm,
as well as its completely bounded counterpart (which we denote with a double diamond).
These are defined as
‖Ξ‖→ = sup
M∈L(d), ‖M‖≤1
‖Ξ(M) ‖ and ‖Ξ‖ = sup
k∈N
‖idk ⊗ Ξ‖→,
where idk : L(k)→ L(k) denotes the identity map on L(k).
Using these definitions, we can reformulate Theorems 3.1 and 3.11 as follows:
Corollary 3.12. Let 0 <  < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U(d) is a
t-design, and let U1, . . . , Un be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal
constant C > 0 such that, if n > C(td)t(t log d)6/2, then with probability at least 1/2, we
have ∥∥∥T (t) − T (t)µ,n∥∥∥1→1 6 ,
where
T (t)µ,n : X ∈ L(dt) 7→
1
n
n∑
i=1
U⊗ti XU
∗⊗t
i .
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Corollary 3.13. Let 0 <  < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U(d) is a
2-design, and let U1, . . . , Un be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal
constant C > 0 such that, if n > Cd2(log d)6/2, then with probability at least 1/2, we
have
‖Θ−Θµ,n‖→ ≤ ,
where
Θµ,n :M∈ L(d) 7→
(
Θµ,n(M) : X ∈ L(d) 7→ 1
n
n∑
i=1
UiM(U∗i XUi)U∗i
)
.
For the applications in the next section, it is natural to define a k-bounded variant of
the completely bounded one-to-one and diamond-to-diamond norms, i.e.
‖M‖,k = ‖idk ⊗M‖1→1 and ‖Ξ‖,k = ‖idk ⊗ Ξ‖→.
By the Schmidt decomposition it is clear that ‖ · ‖,d = ‖ · ‖ and ‖ · ‖,d2 = ‖ · ‖. What
is more, it is well-known that, for any k 6 d, ‖ · ‖,k 6 k‖ · ‖1→1. We now prove a similar
upper bound for ‖ · ‖,k in terms of ‖ · ‖→.
Lemma 3.14. For any linear map Ξ : L(d)→ L(d), we have
‖Ξ‖,k ≤ k2‖Ξ‖→.
Proof. LetM∈ L(kd) with ‖M‖ = 1 be such that
‖Ξ‖,k = ‖idk ⊗ Ξ‖→ = ‖ (idk ⊗ Ξ) (M)‖.
By concavity of the diamond norm, we can assume that M has a Choi matrix ηM ∈
L(k2d2) of rank one, i.e. ηM = |ϕM〉〈φM| for some |ϕM〉, |φM〉 ∈ Ck2d2 . Let us now write
|ϕM〉, |φM〉 ∈ Ck2 ⊗Cd2 in their Schmidt decomposition:
|ϕM〉 =
k2∑
i=1
√
pi|αiβi〉 and |φM〉 =
k2∑
i=1
√
qi|γiζi〉,
where {|αi〉}16i6k2 , {|γi〉}16i6k2 and {|βi〉}16i6k2 , {|ζi〉}16i6k2 are orthonormal families in
Ck2 and Cd2 respectively, and where {pi}16i6k2 , {qi}16i6k2 are subnormalized probability
distributions. We can hence write
M =
k2∑
i,j=1
√
pipjMkij ⊗Mdij ,
where Mkij : L(k) → L(k) is defined as having Choi matrix ηMkij = |αi〉〈γj | ∈ L(k
2) and
Mdij : L(d) → L(d) is defined as having Choi matrix ηMdij = |βi〉〈ζj | ∈ L(d
2). We then
have by the triangle inequality
‖Ξ‖,k = ‖ (idk ⊗ Ξ) (M)‖ 6
k2∑
i,j=1
√
piqj‖Mkij ⊗ Ξ(Mdij)‖ =
k2∑
i,j=1
√
piqj‖Ξ(Mdij)‖.
To finish the proof, we then simply have to observe that
k2∑
i,j=1
√
piqj‖Ξ(Mdij)‖ 6 ‖Ξ‖→
k2∑
i,j=1
√
piqj = ‖Ξ‖→
 k2∑
i=1
√
pi
 k2∑
j=1
√
qj
 6 k2‖Ξ‖→,
where the first inequality is by definition of the diamond-to-diamond norm and the second
inequality is due to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
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4 Application: Quantum non-malleable encryption against adversaries
with small quantum memory
Information-theoretically secure quantum encryption has been studied extensively. In par-
ticular, the one-time variants of security goals such as confidentiality, authenticity and
non-malleability have been defined for quantum encryption. When assessing the efficiency
of a symmetric-key encryption scheme, there are three main figures of merit, the run-
ning time of the encryption and decryption algorithms, the ciphertext length and the key
length. Here, we focus on the latter two figures of merit. Protocols have been designed
which achieve the optimal scaling with respect to key length (up to log factors). More
precisely, the results are as follows. The quantum one-time pad scheme, that encrypts
a quantum system by applying a random element of the Pauli group, requires 2 log d
bits of key [AMTD00]. The quantum authentication scheme presented in [BCG+02] uses
2 log d + O(s) bits of key and log d + O(s) bits of ciphertext to achieve s bits of security.
And non-malleable encryption with unitaries (hence with plaintext space and ciphertext
space being the same) can be done with (4 + o(1)) log d bits of key [ABW09]. Here we
describe a construction for non-malleable encryption without adversarial side information
with unitaries using 2 log d + O(log log d) bits of key. In addition, our scheme has confi-
dentiality against adversaries with side information. In other words, it is an alternative to
the standard quantum one-time pad with the added property of non-malleability without
side information at only an additive logarithmic cost in terms of key length.
One-time-secure quantum encryption
We begin by defining more rigorously the different cryptographic notions mentioned above.
In the following, given a a finite set X , the notation Ex∈X is used to denote the expectation
value of a random variable x distributed uniformly on X .
Definition 4.1 (Quantum encryption scheme). A triple (X ,Enc,Dec) where
i) X is a finite set,
ii) {Encx}x∈X is a family of quantum channels Encx : L(dM )→ L(dC),
iii) {Decx}x∈X is a family of quantum channels Decx : L(dC)→ L(dM )
is called quantum encryption scheme if
∀ x ∈ X , Decx ◦ Encx = id.
The parameters log2 |X |, log2 dM and log2 dC are called key length, message length and
ciphertext length, respectively.
Given a quantum state σ ∈ D(d), define the quantum channel 〈σ〉 ∈ C(d) by 〈σ〉(X) =
Tr(X)σ.
Definition 4.2 (Indistinguishability of ciphertexts). A quantum encryption scheme has
-indistinguishable ciphertexts, if there exists a quantum state σ ∈ D(dC) such that
‖Ex∈X [Encx]− 〈σ〉‖ ≤ .
A quantum encryption scheme has -indistinguishable ciphertexts against adversaries with-
out side information if the above inequality holds with the diamond norm replaced by the
one-to-one norm.
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Definition 4.3 (Non-malleability). A quantum encryption scheme is -non-malleable, if
there exists a quantum state σ ∈ D(dC) such that for all side information dimension dE
and all Λ ∈ C(dCdE) there exist completely positive maps Λ=,Λ 6= ∈ L(dE) whose sum is
trace-preserving and p ∈ [0, 1] such that
‖Ex∈X [(Decx ⊗ id) ◦ Λ ◦ (Encx ⊗ id)]− (p id⊗ Λ= + (1− p)〈σ〉 ⊗ Λ6=)‖ ≤ .
A quantum encryption scheme is -non-malleable against adversaries without side infor-
mation, if there exists a quantum state σ ∈ D(dC) such that for all Λ ∈ C(dC) there exists
p ∈ [0, 1] such that
‖Ex∈X [Decx ◦ Λ ◦ Encx]− (p id + (1− p)〈σ〉)‖ ≤ .
Non-stabilized norms and adversaries without quantum side information
Any family of unitary matrices {Ux}x∈X defines a quantum encryption scheme via the
encryption channels Encx(X) = UxXU∗x and the decryption channels Decx = Enc∗x. For
such unitary quantum encryption schemes, it is easy to see that -indistinguishability of
ciphertexts implies that the family of unitaries is a 2-approximate 1-design in diamond
norm, and any -approximate 1-design in diamond norm gives rise to a quantum encryption
scheme with -indistinguishable ciphertexts. The weaker property of -indistinguishability
of ciphertexts against adversaries without side information and the -approximate 1-design
property measured in one-to-one norm have the same relationship.
Similarly, if a unitary quantum encryption scheme is -non-malleable, then it is a 2-
approximate channel twirl in completely bounded diamond-to-diamond norm, and an -
approximate channel twirl in completely bounded diamond-to-diamond norm gives rise to a
quantum encryption scheme that is -non-malleable [ABW09, AM17]. Again, the weaker -
non-malleability against adversaries without side information and the -approximate chan-
nel twirl property measured in diamond-to-diamond norm have the same relationship.
The results in the previous section thus immediately imply the following for random
unitary encryption schemes:
Theorem 4.4. Let 0 <  < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U(d) is a
2-design, and let U1, . . . , Un be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal
constant C > 0 such that, if n > Cd2(log d)6/2, then with probability at least 1/2, the
quantum encryption scheme defined by the family of unitaries {U1, . . . , Un} has /
√
d-
indistinguishable ciphertexts and is -non-malleable against adversaries without side in-
formation.
Proof. Let us define
T (1)µ,n : X ∈ L(d) 7→
1
n
n∑
i=1
UiXU
∗
i and Θµ,n :M∈ L(d) 7→
1
n
n∑
i=1
UiM(U∗i · Ui)U∗i . (10)
To begin with notice that, if µ is a 2-design then it is a fortiori a 1-design. Hence by
Corollary 3.12 (for t = 1 and /
√
d instead of ) and Corollary 3.13, the probability that
T
(1)
µ,n is an /
√
d-approximate 1-design in one-to-one norm and the probability that Θµ,n
is an -approximate channel twirl in diamond-to-diamond norm are both at least 3/4
for n > Cd2(log d)6/2. By the union bound, both properties hold simultaneously with
probability at least 1/2. And as explained before, if this is so then the corresponding
unitary quantum encryption scheme has /
√
d-indistinguishable ciphertexts and is -non-
malleable against adversaries without side information.
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Using the result of Lemma 3.14, relating the k-bounded diamond norm to the one-to-
one norm and the k-bounded double diamond norm to the diamond-to-diamond norm, we
can immediately derive from Theorem 4.4 a generalisation of it that applies to the case
where the adversary has side information, but in bounded quantity.
Corollary 4.5. Let 0 <  < 1. Assume that the probability measure µ on U(d) is a
2-design, and let U1, . . . , Un be sampled independently from µ. There exists a universal
constant C > 0 such that, if n > Cd2(log d)6k4/2, then with probability at least 1/2, the
quantum encryption scheme defined by the family of unitaries {U1, . . . , Un} has /k
√
d-
indistinguishable ciphertexts and is -non-malleable against adversaries with k-bounded
side information.
Proof. Let T (1)µ,n,Θµ be defined as in equation (10). We have shown in the proof of Theorem
4.4 that, for n > Cd2(log d)6/2, with probability larger than 1/2,∥∥∥T (1) − T (1)µ,n∥∥∥1→1 6 √d and ‖Θ−Θµ,n‖→ 6 .
Now by Lemma 3.14, we know that this implies that∥∥∥T (1) − T (1)µ,n∥∥∥,k 6 k√d and ‖Θ−Θµ,n‖,k 6 k2.
Hence redefining  as k2, we get that, for n > Cd2(log d)6k4/2, with probability larger
than 1/2, T (1)µ,n is an /k
√
d-approximate 1-design in k-bounded diamond norm and Θµ,n
is an -approximate channel twirl in k-bounded double diamond norm. And if this is so
then the corresponding unitary quantum encryption scheme has /k
√
d-indistinguishable
ciphertexts and is -non-malleable against adversaries with k-bounded side information.
A note on efficiency
While our scheme is more efficient in terms of key length and in terms of encryption
and decryption given the element of the design that needs to be applied (if instantiated
with an efficiently implementable 2-design, such as e.g. the Clifford group), specifying the
randomly chosen subset of the exact 2-design is inefficient. This is a problem shared by all
schemes based on the sub-sampling technique, i.e. in particular by the ones constructed in
[HLSW04] and [ABW09]. To construct efficiently specifiable approximate designs in the
weak norms we consider, that are still smaller than approximate designs in the diamond
norm, additional new techniques seem to be necessary. A possible approach would be to,
e.g., analyse random quantum circuits with respect to these norms.
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